15 ideas
| 8793 | If observation is knowledge, it is not just an experience; it is a justification in the space of reasons [Sellars] |
| 8792 | Observations like 'this is green' presuppose truths about what is a reliable symptom of what [Sellars] |
| 8329 | Either causal relations are given in experience, or they are unobserved and theoretical [Sosa/Tooley] |
| 23681 | The first motion or effect cannot be produced necessarily, so the First Cause must be a free agent [Reid] |
| 23676 | A willed action needs reasonable understanding of what is to be done [Reid] |
| 23680 | We are morally free, because we experience it, we are accountable, and we pursue projects [Reid] |
| 8791 | The concept of 'green' involves a battery of other concepts [Sellars] |
| 23678 | A motive is merely an idea, like advice, and not a force for action [Reid] |
| 8324 | The problem is to explain how causal laws and relations connect, and how they link to the world [Sosa/Tooley] |
| 8328 | Causation isn't energy transfer, because an electron is caused by previous temporal parts [Sosa/Tooley] |
| 8327 | If direction of causation is just direction of energy transfer, that seems to involve causation [Sosa/Tooley] |
| 8330 | Are causes sufficient for the event, or necessary, or both? [Sosa/Tooley] |
| 23677 | We all know that mere priority or constant conjunction do not have to imply causation [Reid] |
| 8325 | The dominant view is that causal laws are prior; a minority say causes can be explained singly [Sosa/Tooley] |
| 23679 | The principle of the law of nature is that matter is passive, and is acted upon [Reid] |